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INTRODUCTION 
  There is a large body of literature on the security con-
cerns of electronic health record (EHR) systems. These arti-
cles range from theoretical models for cryptographic or ac-
cess control mechanisms [1] to descriptions of different im-
plemented systems [2], descriptions of different national 
experiences [3,4], practical comparisons between different 
standards, and guidelines for implementing a particular secu-
rity standard [5]. But most of these articles are concerned 
mainly with the confidentiality aspect of the records: that no 
unauthorized party should have read access to them. As we 
discuss in this article, there is a more complex set of re-
quirements regarding integrity, control, legal aspects, and 
other aspects of an integrated health record system. 
  In this article we assume a single computer-accessible 
record of all a person’s health events. We use the term elec-
tronic health record (EHR) for such a system. The EHR 
should be contrasted with a computer record of the patient’s 
health events that is kept, controlled, and maintained by a 
single health organization (HO). We call this second form 
the electronic patient record (EPR). EPRs are maintained by 
a particular HO and contain the patient health data while in 
the care of that organization; therefore, there will be different 
EPRs for a particular patient at a local hospital where he or 
she underwent minor surgery, at a distant hospital where he 
or she was treated for injuries sustained in a car accident, at 
his or her current and past family physicians’ offices, at his 
or her current and past dentists’ offices, and so on, which 
reflects the current situation in most parts of the world. 
  The idea of a single, unique, Internet-accessible EHR has 
been mentioned many times in the literature, sometimes un-
der the name of Lifetime Health Record or Personal Health 
Records but none of the articles discuss the requirement of 
such systems beyond confidentiality [3,4,6-8]. In this article 
we will discuss the requirements of  such an EHR  system on  
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a conceptual level, with no regard for technologies, policies, 
or laws for implementing these requirements. 
  In this article, besides EHR and EPR we will use the term 
health professional (HP), which includes all sorts of profes-
sionals who can have access to the patient’s EHR, including 
physicians, nurses, dentists, psychologists, and alternative 
medicine practitioners. We will also use the term health or-
ganization (HO), which includes organizations ranging from 
a single professional clinic to hospitals. 
  We believe that the central point of an EHR is to gain 
quality and efficiency in caring for the patient. The patient’s 
health conditions and whole health history are available to 
the HP to aid in diagnosis, therapy planning, and patient 
care. This aid can take three main forms: provision of essen-
tial patient health information, efficiency through reuse of 
previous laboratory exams, and opportunistic improvements 
in quality. We will discuss these three forms of aid shortly. 
  Furthermore, the EHR serves as the record of an HP’s 
actions on behalf of that patient and should be the unique 
and definitive source of information about those actions for 
legal and professional purposes. Thus, if some professional 
or legal body is evaluating the HP’s competence, the actions 
and notes the HP recorded in the EHRs of his or her patients 
should be the definitive source of information. 
  The article is organized as follows: In “General Princi-
ples” we discuss confidentiality, control, integrity, and legal 
value and the goals of an EHR. It is important to point out 
that the general principles of confidentiality and integrity are 
well known and well discussed in the literature, but we think 
it is important to list them with other, less well-known and 
less discussed principles for the sake of completeness. In the 
next three sections we discuss the subprinciples related to 
integrity, confidentiality and control, and the legal value of 
the EHR. In “Other Practical Considerations” we discuss 
other principles of a more practical nature, which we believe 
are also very important. In “Related Research” we discuss 
some of the literature on these issues, and in the final section 
we discuss some open issues. This article does not propose 
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these principles are accepted, it will be as a result of the ef-
forts of many researchers and research programs. 
GENERAL PRINCIPLES 
  We assume the following general principles for the EHR: 
•  Confidentiality: The patient’s records are private and 
confidential; no unauthorized person may inspect the 
contents of the patient’s records. 
•  Control: The patient controls the access to his or her 
records. A patient may grant access to an HP and re-
voke such access rights when the treatment is over. 
•  Integrity: The patient’s life may depend on the data 
contained in the records, and therefore only author-
ized people can enter or change the data. 
•  Legal Value: The patient’s records are the unadulter-
ated, complete record of all actions taken by the HPs 
on behalf of that patient and should be the definitive 
source of information about said actions. 
  These general principles of confidentiality, control, integ-
rity, and legal value are further elaborated and discussed in 
the sections that follow. The certainties expressed here will 
be relativized as we elaborate the ethical and practical prin-
ciples. 
  In general terms, confidentiality and control are patient-
related principles. Confidentiality allows the patient to be 
sure that no one but authorized people can read his or her 
records, and control allows the patient to grant an HP read 
and write access to his or her medical records and then re-
voke the access when he or she decides the HP should have 
no longer access to it. 
  Integrity is an HP-related property, and therefore, we 
believe, it is very relevant for the appropriate use of the 
EHR. The whole point of an EHR is to improve the quality 
and efficiency of the HP’s work, and for that integrity is ab-
solutely necessary. 
  Finally, legal value is a very important aspect of the 
EHR, not a secondary aspect, as is sometimes assumed. The 
EHR should be the definitive source of information about the 
HP’s actions on behalf of the patient. 
USES OF THE EHR 
  Medical records, especially paper-based records, have a 
dual purpose: They serve as a legal document that records 
the HP’s and the HO’s actions and as a written collaboration 
medium between HPs (in case the patient is being treated by 
multiple HPs) or as a reminder tool for a single HP over 
time. 
  A central, lifelong EHR has another use: to improve the 
quality of the HP’s actions and decisions by providing rele-
vant patient health data and by potentially providing econ-
omy in patient treatment through the reuse of exam results. 
  The most important aspect of the EHR is that it records 
the current, relevant aspects of the patient’s health, includ-
ing: current diseases, current complaints, allergies and other 
health conditions, and medications being taken. The current 
health aspects of the EHR improve the quality of the patient 
care by helping the HP to avoid drug interaction problems, 
recognize iatrogenic symptoms, avoid allergic reactions to 
drugs, and so on. 
  Furthermore, the EHR contains all recent laboratory ex-
ams of the patient. If the patient had a recent blood sugar test 
that showed normal sugar levels, as long as those results are 
recent enough that they are still valid, and the HP trusts the 
laboratory that performed the exam, and trusts the record, 
then there is no need to ask for a new exam. 
  Finally, the EHR should contain the long-term patient 
medical history. For example, if all blood sugar measures of 
the patient are in a single place, an HP may notice a blood 
sugar pattern that may indicate a potential problem, or the 
HP may better interpret the results of a recent blood sugar 
test in the light of all the previous tests. Or the HP may de-
termine that a current complaint might be attributed to the 
long-term consequences of a disease the patient believes was 
cured long ago. Thus, the HP’s decision-making ability can 
be improved through the opportunistic use of information 
stored in a patient’s medical history. 
Comparison with EPRs 
  An EPR is a more localized medical record, kept in elec-
tronic form. It is usually controlled or owned by an HO, and 
its purpose is similar to that of the paper-based medical re-
cord: as a legal document and a collaboration and reminder 
tool. 
  The literature on EPR focuses mainly on confidentiality. 
A PubMed search in February 2007 for the phrase “Medical 
Records Systems, Computerized” with the keyword "Confi-
dentiality" returned 1408 references, with the keyword "Pri-
vacy", returned 758 references, whereas the keywords 
"Availability" and "Integrity" returned 181 and 114 refer-
ences respectively. 
  Integrity is assumed to be a responsibility of the owner of 
the records and thus a somewhat obvious requirement. Con-
fidentiality, as discussed earlier, is a requirement that serves 
the patient, not the HO, and therefore must be imposed by 
legislation or other external constraints. 
  Control is an irrelevant issue in EPRs: if the patient 
chooses a particular HO he or she is implicitly giving this 
HO the right to create and manage his or her EPR. But it is 
very unclear how a patient would revoke the HO right to 
hold and access his or her records - can the patient request 
his or her records? Can or should the HO keep a copy of said 
records in case the patient sues the HO? 
  We are not aware of much discussion of the legal value 
of the EPR. Clearly all HOs are aware of the legal aspects of 
the records, especially requirements such as compliance with 
national regulations regarding the storage of records. But 
beyond the legal requirements for storage of records, we do 
not know of discussions regarding the effects of the legal 
value of EPR on the systems requirements. 
REQUIREMENTS FOR AN EHR 
Integrity Issues 
  As mentioned earlier, we believe that the integrity as-
pects of the EHR are the most important ones for its purpose, 
which is to provide the information to improve care quality, 
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tunistic gain in quality. But in order to use the information, 
the HP must trust that the information is correct, complete, 
and up to date. 
  The general principle of integrity is that no unauthorized 
person should be able to add, remove, or change any data in 
the EHR. Besides integrity, the following principles are 
closely related: 
Principle 1:  Availability. The EHR must be available 
when the HP needs it. All care in making the 
system robust and redundant is necessary. 
Principle 2:  Up-to-Datedness. The EHR must contain all 
the latest relevant information about the pa-
tient’s health, so there should be no significant 
delay between when data is entered into the 
record and when it becomes available to a dif-
ferent HP. If an HP prescribes some medica-
tion to the patient, that information must be in-
cluded in the EHR as soon as possible, so that 
if the patient consults another HP for some 
other reason, that information is available. 
Principle 3:  Usability. Although usability is not a integrity 
issue, it is also central to the correct use of the 
EHR: An HP should not need to read through 
all the patient’s records to see that he or she 
has an allergy to Novocaine that was diag-
nosed 15 years ago during a dental appoint-
ment. All relevant, current health conditions, 
including allergies, must be easily accessible 
and presented in a clear way to the HP. Search 
facilities must also be provided to enable the 
HP to look for specific data in the patient’s re-
cord. 
Confidentiality and Control Issues 
  Confidentiality states that the patient may expect that no 
unauthorized party will be able to read his or her medical 
records. Therefore, the storage and transmission of the EHR 
should be guarded by security measures that prevent eaves-
dropping. 
  Control states that the patient can decide who should 
have access to his or her records and when this access is re-
voked. The patient grants an HP access to his or her EHR for 
a limited but not predefined duration. While that HP is treat-
ing the patient he or she has access the EHR, but as soon as 
the treatment is over, the HP’s access to the records is 
closed. 
  This raises the interesting question of when a treatment is 
over. In the case of hospitalizations, there are activities that 
mark the end of the treatment, but in other cases it is not so 
clear. Of course, the patient may decide that the treatment is 
over because he or she no longer plans to visit the HP. In this 
case, there should be a way for the patient to revoke the HP’s 
access to his or her EHR without attending the HP’s office. 
  Another partial alternative is to grant access only during 
a consultation. That would preclude the HP accessing exam 
results that are entered into the EHR by a laboratory just 
after the consultation. It would also preclude the HP from 
discussing the case with a colleague, and so on. 
Principle 4:  No Automatic Access Rights to the Patient. 
The patient has no automatic right to read or 
change the EHR. The HP may delegate to the 
patient the right to read part of his own medi-
cal record, but such decision is a medical deci-
sion, one to which the HP may be ethically and 
professionally held accountable.  
  This is a controversial principle that goes against the usu-
ally accepted requirements of electronic medical records and 
the usual understanding of ownership of the patient' medical 
record. To our understanding, the patient has only control 
over his own records, that is he or she can decide which HP 
can access it. But the patient cannot read and cannot change 
his own records, but he or she may receive a delegation to 
read it by one of the HP who have access to it. 
  Our view is that: a) the EHR is a communication medium 
between HPs b) it may or may not be appropriate for the 
patient to have access to this communication, c) it is the HP's 
responsibility to decide whether the patient should have read 
access to his EHR, and d) it is never appropriate for the pa-
tient to change the data in the EHR. 
  The point a) above is the whole purpose of an EHR - the 
communication among the different HPs caring for a patient. 
As for point b) we believe that granting the patient only the 
right to read his or her records also may pose some prob-
lems. Should a patient with a fragile physique be able to read 
that his doctor is considering a serious, degenerative disease 
as a diagnostic hypothesis? Should a patient read in her re-
cords that she is taking a placebo for her psychosomatic 
complaints? We believe that it is the HP’s ethical and profes-
sional responsibility to choose what and how to inform his or 
her patients. Some professionals may choose to disclose all, 
some may not, but it is the HP’s professional responsibility 
to make that choice. This is our point c) above. 
  We do not dispute that in most cases it is probably bene-
ficial to the patient to have read access to his or her own re-
cords, but that is a medical decision of the HP, for which he 
or she should answer ethically, professionally, and legally, 
and therefore patient read access and write access are not a 
design requirement. In fact, the design requirement is not to 
allow read access to the patient, but allow the HP to grant 
such access in cases he or she feels it is in the patients inter-
est. 
  Finally as for point d), we believe that any write access to 
the patient to change the EHR violates integrity and thus 
invalidates the whole purpose of the EHR. For example, can 
a patient with Munchausen syndrome ("the repeated fabrica-
tion of physical illness - usually acute, dramatic, and con-
vincing - by a person who wanders from hospital to hospital 
for treatment" [10]) be trusted to correct his or her own re-
cords for completeness and relevance? 
  Our view, for example, violates the Principle of Access 
in the IMIA Code of Ethics for Health Information Profes-
sionals: 
The subject of an electronic record has the right 
of access to that record and the right to correct 
the record with respect to its accurateness, 
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  We believe that the right to correct the records, as stated 
in the IMIA’s Principle of Access, is misguided and violates 
both the legal value and especially the integrity requirements 
of the record. Access for the patient to alter his own EHR, if 
allowed must follow the principle of incrementability below 
(principle 8). 
Principle 5:  Emergency Access. There are reasonable 
situations in which an HP may access a pa-
tient’s record without his or her previous 
authorization. This is particularly clear in 
emergencies: If the patient comes to an emer-
gency clinic unconscious or otherwise unable 
to grant access to his or her record, the respon-
sible HP must be able to gain access to the re-
cords. 
Principle  6: Implicit Acceptance of HO Structure. By 
granting access to his or her EHR to an HO or 
HP, the patient implicitly accepts whatever ac-
cess delegations are in place in the HO or 
whatever access delegations the HP defines. 
The HO and the HP may be criticized or pun-
ished for these delegations after the fact, but 
the patient cannot control who within the HO 
will have access, or what kind of access, to his 
or her EHR. 
Principle 7:  Limited Read Access for Public Health, Le-
gal, and Professional Entities. Some legal, 
public health, or professional bodies may have 
limited and anonymized read access to the 
EHR without the patient’s approval. If an HP 
or HO is being investigated by a law enforce-
ment agency or reviewed by a professional 
body, these bodies may have read access to 
anonymized segments of the HP’s patients re-
cords that refer to the HP’s (or HO’s) deci-
sions and actions, independent of the patients' 
approval. 
Legal Value 
  As discussed earlier, any medical record has a dual pur-
pose: as the record of the patient’s data and the record of the 
doctor’s medical actions. The legal value of the EHR con-
cerns this second aspect: When challenged in a legal context, 
the doctor must be able to use parts of the EHR to justify his 
or her decisions and actions. Thus, in the proper legal con-
text it should be possible to access a particular doctor’s 
medical actions as recorded in the patient’s EHR, independ-
ent of the patient’s will on the subject. 
Principle 8:  Incrementability. The EHR should be incre-
mental; that is, information can never be re-
moved or altered from the record, only added. 
Of course, there must be a mechanism to add 
corrections to the information already present. 
When presented to an HP, the record will 
show only the corrected version of the data, 
but as we will discuss later, the uncorrected 
version must be kept, along with the correc-
tion, who made it, and when. 
Principle 9:  Nonrepudiability. One cannot deny making 
an entry in a patient’s EHR. This is an impor-
tant requirement for preserving the legal value 
of a record: If the record states that an HP de-
cided on a particular therapy or made a par-
ticular diagnosis, the HP cannot deny that re-
cord. 
Principle 10: Explicit Delegations. In an HO, different pro-
fessionals will enter different data in the pa-
tient’s EHR. The identity of the person who 
entered the data, the person who delegated that 
right to the person, and so on should be clear 
in the record. 
Principle 11: Recoverability of Specific Moments. In order 
to verify the quality of an HP’s decisions and 
actions, it is necessary to restore the EHR to 
the particular moment in time when the HP 
was performing the decisions and actions be-
ing reviewed. Therefore, the system must be 
able to show a snapshot of the EHR at that 
time, without the corrections and data entered 
after that moment. 
Other Practical Considerations 
Principle 12: Right of a Record of One’s Own Work. The 
HP and the HO may have read access to an 
anonymized copy of the segment of the EHR 
that reflects their actions even if they no longer 
have access rights to the record. 
  HPs and HOs have legitimate use for information about 
the medical actions they undertook on behalf of a patient, 
including: billing, research, and quality control. The HP and 
HO should be able to extract the appropriate segments that 
reflect their actions from the patient’s EHR instead of keep-
ing a second or third record for these purposes. 
  Unfortunately, the three legitimate uses of patient infor-
mation just listed have different requirements regarding the 
content of the EHR. The research and quality control copies 
should be anonymized but should contain enough previous 
information about the patient from which one can judge the 
quality of the actions performed or at least consider those 
actions in different contexts. Billing, on the other hand, 
needs identification but no previous information about the 
patient. Thus, care must be taken to avoid linking both cop-
ies because that would disclose too much information about 
the patient. 
Principle 13: Very long storage times. The EHR must last 
at least as long as the patient's life and proba-
bly longer if there are questions about the pa-
tient’s death or final years. This imposes im-
portant constraints on the storage of the data: 
The data must be readable even after decades 
of storage. But, more relevant to this article, 
the digital signatures must also remain valid 
for the corresponding period so that data en-
tered and digitally signed can be verified dec-
ades afterward. 
Principle 14: Substitutability of passwords and keys. It is 
unreasonable to think that a patient will re-
member his or her EHR password or keep a 
smart card throughout his or her life. There 
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words or keys for a patient (provided his or her 
identity has been established with the appro-
priate certainty). Even if the identification 
mechanism is based on biometric data, some 
biometric data may change with time. 
RELATED RESEARCH 
  An article by Buckovich et al. [11], which expresses con-
cerns similar to ours, lists 28 principles regarding electronic 
medical records, compiled from 10 policy documents and 
from U.S. organizations (such as the National Research 
Council), and makes a comparative review between the dif-
ferent sets of principles. Principle 12 in the article states, 
Health care providers have the right to main-
tain private recordings of observations, opin-
ions, and impressions whose release they con-
sider could be potentially harmful to the well-
being of the patient. They shall not disclose this 
information without due reflection on the im-
pact of such release [11]. 
  This principle is particularly relevant to our work be-
cause it is part of our justification for denying access rights 
to patients, which in turn contradicts Principles 2, 3, and 4 
(the right to access, right to a copy, and right to correct or 
amend one’s own record) of the same article. Principle 12 is 
also our justification for the HO’s and HP’s right to a copy 
of the record of their own work. 
  An article by Ross and Lin [12] reviews the literature on 
the benefits of patients’ read access to their own records and 
concludes that although the studies were of limited quality, 
they show “modest improvements in doctor–patient commu-
nication, adherence, patient empowerment, and patient edu-
cation.” The study also points out problems of increased 
anxiety when psychiatric records are made available to the 
patients. An article by Staroselsky et al. [13] reports on the 
benefits of providing read and limited write access to the 
patient’s EHR in terms of accuracy of the data and compli-
ance with treatments. An article by Powell et al. [14] pre-
sents a survey of 31 patients regarding which medical infor-
mation they did not want to be placed in an EHR, which in-
cluded matters of pregnancy, contraception, sexual health, 
and mental health. Also relevant is their finding that some 
patients pointed out information that they believe was incor-
rect about them in their medical records, but some of this 
information was found to be correct (i.e., it corresponded to 
what the physician intended to record). This finding supports 
our argument that the patient must not have write access to 
his or her own records. 
  To our surprise, we found that our view on not granting 
read access to his own health records is not contradictory to 
national legislations such as the USA HIPAA and UK Ac-
cess to Health Records Act of 1990. For example, the HI-
PAA, regarding the rights of the patient to access their medi-
cal records, allows for the health care provider not to agree 
in releasing the information to the patient, if "a licensed 
health care professional, in the exercise of professional 
judgment, determined that it is reasonably likely that access 
to the required information would endanger the life or physi-
cal safety of the consumer or another person" [15]. Further-
more, HIPAA does not include psychotherapy notes as a 
medical document to which the patient has access. The UK 
Access to Health Records [16] is closer to our view: "Cases 
where right of access may be partially excluded (1) Access 
shall not be given under section 3(2) above to any part of a 
health record— (a) which, in the opinion of the holder of the 
record, would disclose– (i) information likely to cause seri-
ous harm to the physical or mental health of the patient or of 
any other individual". 
  Verity and Nicoll [17] describe the tension between con-
fidentiality of the EPR and the interest of public health sur-
veillance and point out that if there are multiple EPRs for 
each patient, anonymization in itself would be problematic 
because of the duplication of data. In our proposal of a single 
EHR, those concerns would be less problematic. 
  A different approach to a single, central EHR is to have 
local EPRs that allow some degree of interchangeability. A 
number of articles discuss the need for standards for inter-
changing and sharing EPRs across different organizations or 
countries [4,18]. 
  Other research articles discuss different technical aspects 
relevant to the issues in this article. Pharow and Blobel [19] 
discuss the issue of long-term storage and its impact on the 
digital signatures in the EHR. Behlen and Johnson [20] and 
Quantin  et al. [21] discuss issues and techniques for the 
anonymization of medical records. Finally, to our knowledge 
Bakker
 [22] was the first to point out the requirement of re-
coverability of specific moments, but the article discusses 
the difficulty in implementing this requirement when the 
EHR is just a set of pointers (or links) to an HO’s specific 
data and processes. 
OPEN ISSUES 
  A large set of issues are not discussed in this article. 
First, we do not propose any implementation or technical 
solution to the security requirements herein. Such solutions 
certainly will involve complex cryptographic techniques, 
trusted central servers, operational procedures in HOs, and 
national-level legislation. We also do not discuss the content 
of the EHR nor how long the data should remain available in 
the EHR. 
  But we think that some of the ethical issues raised here 
warrant further discussion. One is whether the patient can 
ask for certain information to be private and not made avail-
able to other HPs. The patient may tell a particular HP some 
information because he or she trusts the HP and believes that 
the HP can make the appropriate use of that information on 
his or her behalf. But the patient may not trust the entire 
health system and therefore may want that information to be 
unavailable to other authorized HPs. 
  Another complex ethical issue, for which we have no 
solution, is the linking of different patients’ records. Clearly 
there are many situations in which knowing the health condi-
tions of a patient’s parents or spouse will improve the pa-
tient’s care. However, the spouse or parents might not grant 
this HP the right to access their records. 
CONCLUSION 
  In this paper, we presented a set of principles for an 
EHR, a unique, centralized, electronic health record system 
that goes beyond the usual requirement of privacy. We do 
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systems. But the requirements set forth in this paper already 
pose a considerable task to satisfy them. We do not know of 
any technological, legal or economic solution that satisfy 
these requirements. 
  Current attempts to implement some for of centralized 
record system usually fall short in some if not all of these 
requirements. For example, recent developments on Personal 
Health Record by Microsoft and Google do not satisfy integ-
rity, and thus neither legal value. At current technology and 
legal infrastructure, it seems that the most one can do is to 
prioritize a subset of our principles that the system will fol-
low, and accept that the other principles will not be satisfied. 
  If this paper does not put forth any solutions, we hope it 
make it clear that there many more requirements for an EHR 
than privacy, and that further research into the technological 
and legal aspects of an unique health record is needed. 
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